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Abstract
As the capital market develops, listed companies own a 
broader share in the market, but at the same time they are 
also faced with fiercer competition, which forces listed 
companies to disclose more reliable information to attract 
investors for more capitals. Meanwhile, the increase in the 
number of investors and the improvement of the quality 
of the capital market have led to a larger demand for the 
information from listed companies, as well as higher 
requirements made by all sectors of the community for 
information disclosure of listed companies; Mandatory 
accounting information disclosure alone can no longer 
satisfy the diverse needs of investors. As the opposite of 
mandatory disclosure, voluntary disclosure of information 
can improve the quality of corporate information 
disclosure, thus attracting more and more attention.        
This article is divided into three parts. Firstly, 
it expounds the concept of voluntary disclosure of 
information and relating ideas; secondly, on the basis 
of the first part, it analyses the current situation of 
voluntary disclosure in the Chinese market as well as the 
existing problems, such as, unwillingness of voluntary 
disclosure, inadequate disclosed content and unregulated 
disclosure. Finally, corresponding countermeasures to 
improve voluntary information disclosure are put forward, 
namely, to strengthen supervision and to complete the 
corporate governance structure. The countermeasures are 
designed to improve the quality of voluntary disclosure 
and facilitate scientific decision-making for investors and 
other stakeholders, so as to promote the capital market to 
be healthier and more sustainable.
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IntroductIon
Information disclosure of listed companies refers to 
reporting to security regulators and revealing to the 
public the company’s financial situation, operating 
results and other related information, in accordance 
with the relevant laws and regulations. The information 
disclosure institution serves as an effective guarantee for 
regulated operation of the capital market. The history of 
disclosure of accounting information has witnessed the 
transformation from voluntary to mandatory, and then to 
a combination of both. Voluntary information disclosure 
is still a new subject for the Chinese market, but its 
importance is graduating grabbing more attention. Due to 
the fact that Chinese accounting principles and systems 
were not adequately revealed during the making, only 
a small number of stakeholders were able to participate 
in the making of the principles, and thus it was difficult 
to satisfy the demand of market development. Voluntary 
disclosure of accounting information is not restricted 
by the national guidelines. Companies can work out the 
content for voluntary disclosure with their own advanced 
technologies, so as to meet the demands of the investors. 
Therefore, in order to accelerate the process of voluntary 
disclosure of accounting information of listed companies 
in China, it is extraordinarily important to conduct an in-
depth study in its current situation, existing problems and 
their causes. 
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1.  connotAtIon oF VoLuntArY 
InForMAtIon dIScLoSurE oF LIStEd 
coMPAnIES   
1.1   concept  of  Voluntary disclosure of 
Accounting Information of Listed companies 
Improving Business Reporting: Insights into Enhancing 
Voluntary Disclosures issued by Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) in 2001 has given a clear definition 
of voluntary disclosure — the provision of information by 
a company’s management beyond requirements such as 
generally accepted accounting principles and Securities 
and Exchange Commission rules. In recent years, corporate 
voluntary information disclosure has been gradually 
attracting more attention from Chinese accounting 
circles, especially in the Guidelines of the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange for the Investor Relations Management by Listed 
Companies issued in October 2003 by Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange the concept of voluntary disclosure was first 
introduced — listed companies can voluntarily disclose 
information beyond the requirements made by current 
laws and regulations through a wide variety of activities 
including investor relations management.
1.2  differences and relations Between Voluntary 
and Mandatory Accounting Information disclosure 
1.2.1  Differences Between Voluntary and Mandatory 
Accounting Information Disclosure
Information disclosure of listed companies is of great 
significance for the healthy development of the capital 
market. From the perspective of being controlled or not, 
information disclosure can be classified into mandatory 
and voluntary accounting information disclosure. There 
are big differences between these two types of disclosure 
in terms of concept, motive and content. Mandatory 
accounting information disclosure refers to the content 
that is required to be disclosed in financial reports by 
generally accepted accounting principles and other 
laws and regulations. Voluntary accounting information 
disclosure means the information disclosed proactively, 
timely and accurately that is beyond the requirements 
made by security regulators and the information in which 
the company owns partial autonomous right. Mandatory 
accounting information disclosure is likely to cause market 
failure due to the fact that the company is the exclusive 
provider of its information; voluntary accounting 
information disclosure stems from economic globalization 
and it will lead to global expansion of the capital market. 
Due to the pressure of competing for capital, enterprises 
own the motive of reporting voluntarily their corporate 
information, so as to attract capital and improve their 
reputation and competitiveness. 
1.2.2  Relations Between Voluntary and Mandatory 
Accounting Information Disclosure
(1) Consistence of purpose. The model of accounting 
information disclosure of listed companies is the result of 
strategic games between all stakeholders, and mandatory 
and voluntary accounting information disclosure are 
required to be consistent in terms of disclosure target and 
requirements. Both models follows the basic purpose of 
improving the quality of accounting information, and 
the information meet requirements including timeliness, 
accuracy, correlation, reliability and clarity; both models 
are the performance models of corporate governance, of 
which the entire process needs information, both financial 
and non-financial, and meanwhile the governance results 
will be reflected in the company’s financial results 
and development performance, and further more in the 
accounting information that is disclosed. 
(2) Complementarity of content. Both disclosure 
models are complementary to each other. One type of 
information cannot replace another, and such statement 
that one type of information is valuable and another is 
not does not exist. For investors, the value of information 
is not demonstrated in the model of disclosure, but in 
whether the information is related to the content of the 
investors’ decision-making. Overstressing either model is 
inevitably biased to some extent. In the light of voluntary 
accounting information disclosure, on the one hand, it is 
to refine and deepen mandatorily disclosed accounting 
information, and on the other it supplements and expands 
the mandatory information disclosure, in order to highlight 
the company’s core competitive force and disclose the 
information in a more comprehensive and systematic 
way to show the company’s profitability and potential in 
the future. Both models are in the same system, and the 
absence of either one will lead to high risks.
(3) The two can convert into each other. Voluntary 
and mandatory accounting information disclosure can 
convert into each other. First, because of different cultural 
and legal background, the same information that should 
be disclosed mandatorily in certain countries might 
be disclosed voluntarily by corporates. For instance, 
information of company employees is mandatorily 
disclosed information in the UK and Australia; in other 
countries in the European continent, however, this is the 
information that can be disclosed on a voluntary basis. 
Second, the accounting information that can be disclosed 
voluntarily now may, with the political, social and 
economic development, become mandatorily disclosed 
in formation in the future. For example, in the Chinese 
security market, the profit forecast of a company was 
mandatory to disclose before April 2000, but will become 
voluntary after 6 April 2000 according to new laws 
and regulations. And vice versa, voluntarily disclosed 
accounting information can turn into mandatory. Third, the 
way and time of mandatory information disclosure can be 
chosen voluntarily, and voluntary information disclosure 
can be induced by mandatory one or serve as a necessary 
supplement for mandatory disclosure. For instance, the 
annual report is the regular report that must be disclosed 
mandatorily, and the time to disclose the annual report 
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can be decided by the high-level managers. Information 
disclosure is the result of the strategic game between 
all stakeholders. Mandatory and voluntary accounting 
information disclosures are seemingly contradictory, but 
in essence these two models of information disclosure are 
internally related. 
2.  currEnt SItuAtIon oF VoLuntArY 
InForMAtIon dIScLoSurE oF cHInESE 
LIStEd coMPAnIES And tHE EXIStInG 
ProBLEMS
Chinese security market originated from the early 1990s. 
After decades of development, great achievements 
have been made in terms of accounting information 
disclosure—regulations of information disclosure have 
been gradually improved and the supervision system 
of information disclosure of listed companies have 
been more completed. With the development of the 
capital market, all sectors of the community have made 
higher requirements for information disclosure of listed 
companies, and mandatory information disclosure alone 
cannot meet diverse requirements from the investors. 
As the opposite of mandatory disclosure, voluntary 
disclosure of information can improve the quality of 
corporate information disclosure, thus attracting more 
and more attention. Although voluntary information 
disclosure is developing towards a positive trend, due 
to the deficiencies in the capital market, Chinese listed 
companies are still faced with a small funding pressure, 
and thus there are still a number of problems existing 
in voluntary accounting information disclosure, such as 
starting late and unregulated disclosure. 
2.1 unwillingness of Voluntary Accounting 
Information disclosure
In China, due to the less developed capital market and 
the limited conditions, there is just a small number of 
companies that can enter the market for funding. Therefore 
the investors outnumbered the listed companies, and the 
excessive supply leads to a smaller pressure for the funding 
raisers. In addition, companies have only limited cost, 
and they fear they may face lawsuits due to inaccurate 
information disclosed on a voluntary basis. Besides, there 
is a lack of sincerity and transparency in the market. As 
a result, Chinese listed companies show unwillingness to 
some extent to disclose their information voluntarily. 
2.2  Inadequate content of Voluntary Accounting 
Information disclosure
Voluntarily disclosed information mainly includes: 
managers’ evaluation of the company’s long-term 
strategies and competitive edges, environmental protection 
and social responsibilities, actual operating information, 
forward-looking information, human resources information 
and operating effects, etc.. As classified by Shenzhen 
Security Institute, there are mainly the following five 
types of information, namely, background information, 
historical information, key non-financial information, 
forecast information, discussion and analysis from the 
management level. However, from the currently disclosed 
information from Chinese companies, the background 
information is general description, such the steps and 
actions taken for achieving the goal, schedule for 
completing the strategies and barriers the company may 
face. There is hardly information about the impact of these 
barriers on current and future profit. The current situation 
about social responsibility information disclosure in China 
is engendering little optimism. Although the National 
People’s Congress and the State Council have established 
the committee and issued “Environmental Protection Law” 
and dozens of laws about environmental protection and 
resource utilization as well as a series of administrative 
laws and regulations, the present laws and regulations 
about social responsibilities still focus on environmental 
management and the information need of the country. 
There is a lack of rules, principles and guidelines for 
social responsibility information disclosure, and thus the 
companies are short of motives of disclosing information 
voluntarily, and the little and scattered information they 
disclose is far from being comprehensive. By March 2007, 
14 large state-owned companies and 2 private companies 
had made the public their social responsibility reports, 
but Chinese companies are still far behind multinational 
companies from western countries. 
2.3  Inaccurate and unregulated Voluntary 
Information disclosure 
Due to the consistent technological guidelines for 
voluntary accounting information disclosure for Chinese 
listed companies, managers from some companies, 
worrying about investors’ doubt about the company’s 
prospect and the falling stock price, are reluctant to 
disclose information voluntarily, so their disclosed 
information are not accurate and regulated enough; some 
do not disclose timely or even disclose nothing, some 
disclose financial indexes that are far different from the 
real one, and some only give general and ambiguous 
information with no value, fearing they may face lawsuits 
due to inaccurate information. For example, they disclose 
hardly forecast accounting information, sales information 
or market share rate; instead they only give in accurate 
profit forecast.
2.4  Lack of Variety in the Ways of Voluntary 
Information disclosure
Voluntary disclosure of information by listed companies is 
carried out mainly through the following three channels. 
Firstly, it is done through regular financial reports (listing 
announcements, annual reports, financial statements of the 
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first half of the year and season reports). The information 
includes the company’s governance information, analysis 
and evaluation from the managers, environmental 
protection and social responsibilities. Secondly, it is 
done through communication with brokers, investors 
from institutions and specialized security analysts. This 
kind of communication is sort of private; normally after 
regular reports issued or major investment announced 
by the company, brokers, investors from institutions and 
specialized security analysts would ask the listed company 
to give further explanation about the content of the 
reports or the investment. Thirdly, listed companies issue 
information about core competitiveness, environmental 
protection and social responsibilities. This type of 
voluntary information disclosure is fast and influential, and 
can get timely response from the market. At present, there 
are two types of voluntary information disclosure, namely, 
regular reports and temporary reports. There are few 
opportunities of communication with agencies, especially 
with small and medium agencies as well as disclosure 
through television, networks and other forms of media.  
2.5  cause Analysis of Problems Existing in 
Voluntary Information disclosure by chinese 
Listed companies
In Chinese security market, there are some particular 
forms of manifestation due to the incomplete market 
institution and the severe ineffective information balance 
problems. In brief, problems in this perspective mainly 
exist in the following aspects. 
2.5.1  Incomplete Capital Market 
Chinese listed companies are mainly state-owned enterprises, 
and state-owned shares account for most of the stock. Lack 
of status for state-owned shares owners and individual 
shareholders have lower requirements for information 
disclosure, and thus the listed companies face smaller 
pressure in this respect. Moreover, compared with investors 
in developed countries, the number of investors from 
institutions and individual investors is far behind, and the 
requirements for information disclosure are not high enough. 
Therefore, the level of voluntary information disclosure of 
Chinese listed companies is comparatively lower. 
2.5.2  Low Cost of Law Violation and Inadequate 
Regulation and Punishment 
CSRC is featured with weak power and low authority, and 
the security market is filled with conflicts. The government 
is used to control the market in administrative ways 
instead of following the particular rules of the market. 
Due to the investors’ low quality, useful accounting 
information cannot be conveyed to the investors and 
others who need the information in a comprehensive and 
timely manner. Hence, the inadequate supervision is also 
one of the causes for problems existing in accounting 
information disclosure.  
2.5.3  Deficient Listed Companies’ Governance 
Structure and Mechanism 
For listed companies, effective governance structure and 
institution can not only protect investors’ interests, but 
also enhance the transparency of accounting information 
disclosure. The problems are also related to the 
deficiencies in the governance structure and the weakened 
governance institution. (1) The governance structure of 
listed companies is not complete. They have set up the 
board of directors and supervisors and recruited general 
managers, but the governance structure does not play its 
role; in other words, it is only a matter of formalization. 
a) Rights and responsibilities of the board of directors and 
the management level are not clear. The board of directors 
is the centre for decision-making and the general manager 
should be responsible for daily operation of the company. 
b) The board of directors is ineffective. In actual work, 
the board of directors cannot give full paly to its function 
and behave ineffectively in making decisions. c) The 
board of directors are controlled by big shareholders. 
The biggest shareholder for most companies in China is 
the country, so the chairman and board of directors lose 
their independency. d) The supervision institution of the 
board of directors is weakened. The company is internally 
controlled seriously due to lack of effective supervision 
and balancing mechanism. (2) The external management 
of listed companies is not complete. The external 
management institution mainly stems from the balance 
between managers and the capital market, between 
managers and the manager market as well as between 
managers and the product market. It is mainly shown 
in the following aspects: a) The stock structure of listed 
companies is not reasonable, so individual shares accounts 
for a small proportion and are too speculative despite its 
high liquidity. b) Commercial banks play a limited role in 
corporate governance, and the function of the investors 
from institutions is also very weak. c) Operators of limited 
companies are short of pressure in taking over the market. 
The state-owned regrouping, merging, “selling shell” and 
“buying shell” are mainly brokered by listed companies 
and other related companies or by high-level managers, so 
they are administrative and to some extent impartial. 
3 .   S t r At E G I E S  t o  I M P r o V E 
V o L u n t A r Y  d I S c L o S u r E  o F 
AccountInG InForMAtIon BY LIStEd 
coMPAnIES In cHInA 
3.1  Guidelines for Voluntary Information disclosure
3.1.1  The Principle of Authenticity
The principle of authenticity means that listed companies 
should be honest in disclosing the true information 
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beyond the regulations and the information in which the 
company has the autonomous right. The information will 
have a direct impact on the decision-making of investors 
and other stakeholders. First, listed companies should 
give accurate accounting information voluntarily without 
overrating or underrating. The information they give 
should objectively reflect the company’s operating and 
financial status, instead of being made up to affect the 
stock price or manipulate others. Then the companies 
should make sure that the disclosed information is 
consistent so as not to mislead the investors. 
3.1.2  The Principle of Completeness
The principle of completeness means that all information 
affecting investors’ decisions should be disclosed, 
without deliberate concealing or major leaving out. While 
disclosing certain specific information, one must reveal all 
aspects of the information in a thorough, comprehensive 
and complete way；One should disclose not only 
information favorable to the company’s stock price, but 
also the negative information. Information about potential 
or actual risks should not be left out. The investors will 
make decisions according to all the information disclosed 
by the company, so the companies are required to present 
the compete image of the company in front of the 
investors. Complete and voluntary disclosure of accounting 
information should involve the completeness of content 
and formats: first the content should be complete, without 
man-made hiding or leaving out; second the format, 
method and language of information disclosure should be 
regulated and understandable, and the information should 
be disclosed on wide-covering media. 
3.1.3  The Principle of Timeliness
The principle of timeliness means that listed companies 
should disclose their accounting information voluntarily 
as soon as possible. When the operating and financial 
situation changes, the company should immediately 
inform the details to investors and other stakeholders. 
This principle is a continuous obligation, namely, during 
the period from issuing securities to running the company, 
the information disclosed to investors should be updated 
in real time. Then investors can make rational choices 
according to the updates. On the security market, the 
value of information lies in its timeliness. A complete 
information disclosure system should have true and 
comprehensive information, as well as an effective 
and fast pathway for information. Only by enabling 
all market participants to access relevant information 
timely, can the fairness and effectiveness be ensured. The 
principle of timeless requires listed companies to disclose 
their important information legally and timely. Listed 
companies should inform the investors of major changes 
and events of the company, so as to make sure the fair and 
ordered operation of the market. 
We should stick to the above-mentioned principles 
for voluntary disclosure of accounting information, and 
improve the quality of information disclosure, so as to 
give investors easier access to more accurate information, 
and thus they can make smarter decisions.
3.2  to Enhance Laws and regulations About 
Voluntary Accounting Information disclosure 
Currently, there are no laws and regulations governing the 
content and format of voluntary accounting information 
disclosure in China, so managers can,  taking into account 
the company’s own interests, choose to disclose or not the 
information. Voluntary accounting information disclosure 
is relatively independent, and it can reflect the transparency 
of accounting information. However, it cannot be operated 
by the management level of the company; otherwise the 
transparency will deteriorate further.  
In order to decrease this kind of situations and give 
full play to its function as signal pathways, post facto 
supervision must be conducted on the reliability of 
corporates’ information disclosure, and punishment 
should be exerted on entities and individuals abusing 
voluntary information disclosure, so as to achieve the goal 
of effectively protecting the interests of investors. 
Regulators’ supervision on information disclosure 
includes the supervision not only on the content, but also 
on the timing, expression, forms and media. Therefore, it 
can be understood that listed companies can voluntarily 
disclose their accounting information, but once the 
information is out, it must meet the specified qualities to 
avoid misleading the public. These basic qualities involve 
the quality of the information content and the information 
disclosure. At present, auditors and national regulators pay 
more attention to and spend more efforts in the content. 
But the quality of accounting information disclosure 
should never be neglected. The management of accounting 
information disclosure has a significant impact on its 
transparency. Therefore, more focus should be put on the 
timeliness, equity accessibility of accounting information 
disclosure and the relations between accounting information 
and related information, so that investors can access and 
interpret the accounting information in an easier way and 
improve the transparency of accounting information. 
3.3  to Strengthen regulation of china Securities 
regulatory commission (cSrc) and Ensure Its 
regulation Ability
To establish the authority of CSRC calls for not only an 
ordered business allocation between CSRC and other 
regulators, but also a stronger regulating ability, so as 
to obtain true recognition from the security market. 
According to the actual situation in China, first other 
governmental organization’s regulating power should 
be taken back to CSRC, making CSRC the only and 
highest security regulator all across the country. Then 
CSRC should be scaled up. In developed countries with 
a mature and regulated security market, a large-scale 
and strong security regulator is still necessary, not to 
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mention in China, where the security market is not mature 
enough and law violations are frequent. Strengthening 
the regulating power does not only refer to increasing the 
number of regulating staff, but also involve making sure 
the staff are qualified to do their job. Examinations of all 
forms should be carried out to recruit high quality and 
experienced talents in this field. 
3.4  to complete the corporate Governance 
Structure and Establish Effective Main Body of 
Supply for Accounting Information 
A complete corporate governance structure is an effective 
way to prevent man-made unreal information disclosed 
by listed companies. A reasonable and improved 
company governance structure can promote the regulated 
information disclosure, improve the quality of the 
disclosed information and ensure the authenticity of 
accounting information to the largest extent. Only with 
competed property institution can the shareholders pursue 
maximum capital gains and form a contract relationship 
with the managers of the company, and then form the 
main body of demand for the real financial reports. 
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